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Mars New Zealand Ltd v Roby Trustees Ltd 
HC Auckland CIV-2011-404-4613, 7 December 2011 
This was a successful appeal by Mars against a decision of 
the Assistant Commissioner of Trade Marks. The respon-
dent, Roby, had applied to register a mark incorporating the 
words "Optimize Pro Lead The Pack" as a trade mark to be 
used for dog rolls in class 31. Mars opposed the application 
as similar to Mars' device and word marks using the words 
OPTMUM and OPTIMATE also in class 31. Mars' opposi-
tion was based on ss 17(1)(a) and (b) and 25(1)(b) and (c) of 
the Trade Marks Act 2002. The Assistant Commissioner 
declined to uphold Mars' opposition and Mars appealed. On 
appeal, Mars submitted that the Assistant Commissioner 
was incorrect in concluding that that there was no similarity 
between the Roby and Mars marks, and in concluding that 
there was no likelihood of deception or confusion. In the 
High Court, Venning J said that the relevant date was the 
date on which Roby filed its trade mark application, 16 July 
2009. The Judge first considered s 17(1 )(a), applying the 
principles in Pioneer Hi-Bred Corn Company v Hy-Line 
Chicks Pty Ltd, l which he said required consideration of: 
(a) the relevant geographical and product market within 
New Zealand; 
(b) whether there was a substantial awareness or reputa-
tion in respect of the registered and unregistered marks 
of Mars; and 
(c) a comparison of the marks to determine whether a 
substantial number of persons within the market were 
likely to be perplexed or have their minds mixed up by 
the use of Roby's proposed mark. 
The Judge said that the geographical and product market 
was the market throughout New Zealand for chilled dog roll 
and dog food products. Roby's dog rolls were essentially the 
same product as Mars' Optimum chilled dog roll product 
and were similar to Mars' other Optimum pet food formats 
for dogs and cats. The Judge also said that the Mars' device 
marks and the OPTIMUM word mark were likely to have 
been well-known in the relevant market in relation to Mars' 
products. He said that the real issue under s 17(1)(a) was 
whether Roby's use of its proposed "Optimize Pro" device 
mark would be likely to deceive or cause confusion amongst 
a substantial number of persons in the relevant market. He 
noted that the Assistant Commissioner considered it would 
not cause such deception or confusion primarily because she 
considered Roby's proposed mark was visually, aurally and 
conceptually dissimilar to Mars' marks, but the Judge did not 
agree with this conclusion. The Judge made a detailed com-
parison of the marks, identifying "Optimize Pro" and "Opti-
mum" as the respective dominant features of the two marks. 
The overall impression or concept of the marks was the 
concept of the best or a premium product. So, while on a side 
by side comparison there were a number of differences in the 
marks, the main concept was essentially the same. The Judge 
said that customers of Mars who had previously bought 
Optimum dog food might well be confused and consider 
Optimize Pro to be a Mars product, particularly given the 
nature of the goods,2 which were self-serve consumer items 
likely to be found in the same area of the supermarket. The 
products were directly competitive with each other in the 
same market. The Judge concluded that the visual, but more 
significantly, the aural and conceptual similarities between 
the marks were such that, when taken with the developed 
brand and consumer awareness of Mars' marks, it was 
inevitable that the use of Roby's proposed mark would 
deceive or cause confusion to a substantial number of per-
sons in the relevant market. It was argued for Roby that 
"Optimize" was descriptive and that other traders may wish 
to use the word to describe their products. The Judge held 
that "optimize" was not normally descriptive of dog rolls, 
that it was not used descriptively, and that it was identified 
with Mars' products. The Judge concluded that a substantial 
number of persons in the relevant market were likely to be 
perplexed or have their minds mixed up by the use of Roby's 
proposed mark so that the use of the proposed mark would 
be likely to deceive or cause confusion. 
The Judge then considered s 17(1 )(b), concluding that use 
by Roby of its proposed mark in relation to dog rolls would 
also constitute misleading and deceptive conduct in breach of 
the Fair Trading Act 1986, and accordingly would be disentitled 
to protection under s 17(1)(b). The Judge then considered 
s 25(1)(b), applying the test in NV Sumatra Tobacco Trading 
Co v New Zealand Milk Brands.3 The Judge concluded that, 
for similar reasons to those above, s 25 applied. The goods 
and marks were the same or similar, and there was a likeli-
hood of deception or confusion. 
The Judge then briefly considered s 25(1)(c), saying that 
while similarity remained an important issue, there was an 
additional focus, where goods or services were dissimilar, on 
"connection in the course of trade". The Judge considered 
that essential elements of Roby's proposed mark were similar 
to Mars' marks, that the respective goods were the same, and 
1. Pioneer Hi-Bred Corn Company v Hy-Line Chicks Pty Ltd [1978] 2 NZLR 50 (CA) at 61-62. 
2. Referring to British Sugar Pic v James Robertson & Sons Ltd [1996] RPC 281 (Ch) 290-296. 
3. NV Sumatra Tobacco Trading Co v New Zealand Milk Brands Ltd [2011] 3 NZLR 206. 
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that use of Roby's proposed mark was likely to prejudice the 
interests of Mars. The Judge did not consider the issue of 
whether Mars' marks were well-known in New Zealand. 
The Judge allowed the appeal, upholding Mars' opposi-
tion to Roby's trade mark application. 
Fonterra Brands (Tip Top Investments) Ltd 
v Tip Top Restaurant Ltd 
HC Wellington CIV-2011-485-1011, 4 November 2011 
This was a successful appeal against a decision of the 
Assistant Commissioner of Trade Marks. The respondent, 
Tip Top Restaurant Ltd ("TTR"), had applied to register the 
word mark TIP TOP as a trade mark. Fonterra opposed 
registration. The Assistant Commissioner rejected Fonterra's 
opposition and allowed TTR's registration to proceed. 
Fonterra had used the registered trade mark TIP TOP 
(and variations) in relation to ice cream and other products 
since 1936, and had invested heavily in advertising the 
brand. TIP TOP products were sold in a large number of 
retail outlets throughout New Zealand. The respondent, 
TTR, operated a restaurant/cafeltakeaway in Dunedin, and a 
TIP TOP named store had operated in that location since 
1936. TTR had bought the business in 2003, and applied to 
register the trade mark TIP TOP on 27 June 2007. 
The Assistant Commissioner concluded that the proposed 
TTR marks would not be likely to deceive or cause confusion 
so that s 17(I)(a) and (b) of the Trade Marks Act 2002 did 
not apply. She also concluded that s 25(I)(a) and (b) did not 
apply, because the goods and services covered by the two 
marks were neither the same nor similar. In relation to 
s 25(I)(c), the Assistant Commissioner concluded that the 
respective services were not similar, and that use of TTR's 
proposed mark would not be taken as indicating a connec-
tion in the course of trade with Fonterra. 
On appeal, Fonterra argued that the Assistant Commis-
sioner erred in: 
(a) the application of the relevant legal test under s 17 of 
the Trade Marks Act 2002; 
(b) the application of the relevant legal test under s 25(1)(a) 
and (b) of the Trade Marks Act 2002; and 
(c) the application of the relevant legal test under s 25 (1) (c) 
of the Trade Marks Act 2002. 
The Judge began by considering s 25(I)(a) and (b). TTR had 
conceded that the marks were the same. The Judge said that 
this meant the issues under s 25(I)(a) and (b) were the same, 
being first whether the proposed mark related to similar 
goods and service to those for which Fonterra's marks were 
registered and second whether the use of TTR's proposed 
mark was likely to deceive and confuse. 
The Judge considered4 that the goods and services were 
similar. The Judge said that TTR's application covered a wide 
range of services well beyond those currently performed by 
the company. They included services at a cafe, snack bar and 
coffee house, and covered a very broad range of the services 
providing food, and could involve the provision of ice cream 
to the public. The Judge said that the proper comparison on 
which the assessment of similarity was to be made was the 
nominated specifications that TTR applied for with respect 
to its proposed trade mark and the specifications of the 
existing trade mark. It was not simply the current use of the 
respective parties but the use to which the proposed and 
existing trade marks could be put. On this approach he was 
satisfied that there were sufficient similarities so that the 
second aspect of s 25(I)(a) and (b) was established. Both 
marks related to food and included provision of food to the 
public, and it would be well within the ambit of the specifi-
cations nominated by TTR to set up an ice cream parlour. 
The fact that one party was selling goods and the other 
services was not in itself a disqualifying factor.s The Judge 
held that there was close connection and, therefore, a simi-
larity between the goods produced by Fonterra under the TIP 
TOP brand and the services intended to be provided by TTR 
under the TIP TOP mark if registration was granted. The 
necessary similarity of goods and services in terms of s 25 (1) (a) 
and (b) was established. 
The Judge then considered whether the use of TTR's 
proposed mark was likely to deceive and confuse. The Judge 
held that the fair and normal use of TTR's mark was likely to 
cause confusion, and to deceive a significant percentage of 
the public, based on his assessment of the normal and fair use 
of the proposed mark compared with the actual use of FB's 
mark and the conclusions of a survey undertaken by Fonterra. 
This finding related to both the ss 17(1)(a) and 25(1)(a) and 
(b) "tests" of deception and confusion. 
The Judge went on to consider s 25 (1) (c). He held that, as 
conceded, the TTR trade mark was identical to one of the 
trade marks relating to TIP TOP held by Fonterra, that the 
survey evidence clearly established that the existing mark 
was well-known in New Zealand, and that the respective 
goods and services were similar. The issue then was whether 
the use of TTR's trade mark would be taken as indicating a 
connection in the course of trade between TTR's services and 
Fonterra's goods and likely to prejudice the interests of 
Fonterra. The Judge said that many of the consuming public 
would assume TTR's TIP TOP cafe, take-away shop or ice 
cream parlour belonged to or was being operated by Fonterra, 
and it was likely that, given the marks were identical and 
both marks related to food products, the public would assume 
a connection between the two. This confusion would preju-
dice Fonterra's interests and could result in a loss of brand 
integrity for Fonterra. TTR would also unfairly benefit from 
Fonterra's advertising and brand recognition. The Judge held 
that it was likely that the public would think there was a 
connection in trade and that there clearly would be prej udice 
to Fonterra and its trade mark. Section 25(I)(c) therefore 
applied. 
The Judge said that there was no need to consider s 17( l)(b) 
in the circumstances. 
The next issue was s 26, as s 25 was subject to s 26, the 
exception for honest concurrent use. The Judge noted that 
s 17(I)(a) was not subject to s 26, and given that s 17(I)(a) 
applied, the use of the TIP TOP mark was prohibited by s 17. 
The Judge nevertheless considered s 26 for the sake of 
completeness. TTR submitted that, if it was found that s 25 
4. Applying the principles in British Sugar PIc v James Robinson & Sons Ltd [1996] RPC 281 at 296-297. 
5. Citing Aromas Pty Limited v Aroma Coffee & Tea Company Ltd (1997) 40 IPR 75 and Rowntree PIc v Rollbits Pty 
(1998) 10 IPR 539. 
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applied, then TTR wished to invoke s 26(1)(b) honest con-
current use so that the trade mark could be registered. The 
Judge said that the issue here of honest concurrent use 
involved an assessment of the following factors: 6 
(a) the extent of the use of both the existing and proposed 
mark; 
(b) the extent of confusion, if any, between the work; 
(c) the honesty of use of the proposed mark; and 
(d) public convenience if the mark was registered. 
The Judge said that the Fonterra mark was well-known and 
widely used throughout New Zealand whereas TTR's mark 
was likely to be well-known in Dunedin in relation to the 
restaurant, but not known more widely. As found, the poten-
tial for confusion and deception was widespread. In relation 
to the honesty of the use, the Judge said that the current use 
of the TIP TOP brand for the restaurant in the Octagon in 
Dunedin was long standing, and there was no reason to think 
the current and past use of TIP TOP by the restaurant given 
its historic connection and the continuity of its use was 
anything other than honest. However, TTR's plans to expand 
the TTR brand TIP TOP beyond Dunedin's borders together 
with the possible extension of businesses with the name TIP 
TOP did bring into question the motives for the expansion 
using the TIP TOP name, and raised the question whether 
this was an opportunistic application designed by TTR to 
trade on the existing TIP TOP trade mark and thereby 
advantage itself. In relation to public convenience, the Judge 
said that the potential for confusion or deception of the 
public meant public inconvenience was significant. The Judge 
concluded that no challenge to the honesty of the use of the 
proposed mark could be made with respect to the Dunedin 
restaurant business, but that there was a legitimate challenge 
to the honesty of the proposed use of the mark in the sense 
that the proposed expansion could be seen as an opportunis-
tic action to try and trade on a very well-known trade mark. 
The Judge was satisfied of honest concurrent use with regard 
to a restaurant/cafe business in and around central Dunedin 
but not otherwise. He said that he would have been prepared 
to order registration of the trade mark subject to that trade 
mark being used only with respect to a restaurant, cafe or 
similar business operated in the central Dunedin business 
district and not otherwise. However, since s 17(1)(a) applied, 
s 26 had no application. The Judge allowed the appeal. 
Adidas AD V Forrester Hilton 
HC Auckland CIV-2011-404-27S1, 9 September 2011 
This was an oral judgment in an application by the 
plaintiffs, collectively "Adidas", seeking summary judgment 
for trade mark infringement. 
The defendant, Mr Hilton, was alleged to have imported 
products infringing the "Adidas" and "Reebok" marks. In 
September 2010, two Determination Notices were issued by 
Customs New Zealand in respect of "Reebok" marks. Mr 
Hilton was the importer, and the imports resulted in success-
ful proceedings brought by Adidas against Mr Hilton. 
In April and May 2011 Customs New Zealand issued 
further Determination Notices to Mr Hilton and four other 
named individuals in respect of "Adidas" and "Reebok" 
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branded clothing. Adidas submitted that these importations 
were effected by or on behalf of Mr Hilton. The Judge held 
that the evidence supported this contention. He also held that 
the products infringed. 
Adidas sought orders for the destruction of the goods and 
an injunction preventing Mr Hilton and any of his associates 
from infringing their trade marks in future by importing 
counterfeit goods into New Zealand. The Judge issued a 
declaration under s 153(1) of the Trade Marks Act 2002 that 
the goods were goods on which an infringing sign was used, 
other than for private or domestic use. He ordered that the 
goods be forfeited to the Crown and destroyed, under s 154( 1)( c), 
and he issued an injunction. 
AA Insurance Ltd v AMI Insurance Ltd 
HC Wellington CIV-2010-48S-2427, 2 November 2011 
In this case AMI Insurance sought registration of a series 
of 15 trade marks, known as "my marks". These marks 
comprised, for the most part, purely descriptive words pre-
ceded by "my". Examples were MY INSURANCE, MY 
CAR INSURANCE, MY HOUSE INSURANCE, MY CON-
TENTS INSURANCE, MY LIFESTYLE INSURANCE, and 
so on. AMI applied for registration of the marks on 19 Janu-
ary 2007, in Class 36. A great number of "my marks" had 
been registered in New Zealand, but their registrability had 
not been tested. The appellants, AA Insurance, lAG, Vero 
and Tower, were all competing insurance companies. They 
appealed a decision of the Assistant Commissioner of Trade 
Marks rejecting their opposition to registration of the marks 
and rejecting AA and Tower's application for a declaration of 
invalidity in respect of a series of marks already registered, 
the MY MULTI QUOTE series. The grounds of opposition 
and invalidity were generally those contained in s 18 (1) (b )-( d) 
of the Trade Marks Act 2002. 
The Assistant Commissioner held under s 18 (1) (a) that 
the inclusion of MY in each of the marks made the mark as a 
whole capable of distinguishing AMI's services, because none 
of the marks was generic. In relation to s 18(1)(c), the 
Assistant Commissioner also rejected the opposition, and 
held that the average consumer would be towards the very 
observant and circumspect end of the spectrum, and that the 
relevant services could be distinguished from fast-moving 
consumer goods. The Assistant Commissioner held that the 
average consumer would perceive the use of "MY" as awk-
ward and unusual, that the average consumer was likely to be 
receptive to the possibility that MY was distinctive because 
of exposure to other "my marks" such as MY SKY, that 
while MY INSURANCE was wholly descriptive when used 
by a consumer who had acquired the product, it was not 
descriptive when used by a trader, and a consumer's acquisi-
tion of a product was not a descriptive characteristic for the 
product. In relation to s 18(1)(b) and (d), the Assistant 
Commissioner held that "MY" added a distinctive element 
to otherwise generic phrases, that other traders were not 
likely to want to use the same or similar marks in good faith 
because they were not descriptive and use of "MY" only 
made sense when used by a consumer not a trader. The 
Assistant Commissioner therefore dismissed the grounds of 
opposition and invalidity under s 18. 
6. Citing VB Distributors v Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co Ltd (1999) 9 TCLR 349. 
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In the High Court, the Judge said that this was a general 
appeal by way of rehearing, and that he must arrive at his 
own assessment on the merits.7 
The Judge considered distinctiveness under s 18(1)(b), 
noting that in this case the inquiries under s 18(1)(a) (capable 
of distinguishing test) and 18(1)(b) (distinctiveness test) were 
essentially the same because there was no question of acquired 
distinctiveness. The Judge referred to the test in W & G du 
Cros Ltd8 and the Cycling IS case9 as summarised in the 
IPONZ Practice Guidelines.10 The Judge reviewed the argu-
ments. The appellants argued that MY INSURANCE and its 
variations had no distinctive character, and AMI argued that 
the addition of MY added a distinctive element so that the 
marks, taken as a whole, were not merely descriptive or 
generic and were registrable. 
The Judge held that the marks were not distinctive. He 
said that MY did not make distinctive what would otherwise 
be a descriptive or generic mark. It could not, of itself, denote 
origin without something more, for two reasons. First, AMI's 
competitors were likely, in the ordinary course of business 
and without any improper motive, to want to use my-oriented 
phrases in connection with their own products. In this regard, 
the Judge considered the evidence from the appellants that 
several of the marks were used by them and other insurance 
providers in their marketing and contractual material, and 
that several of the marks were used by consumers when 
communicating with the appellants. The Judge was con-
cerned about an inappropriately chilling effect on the appel-
lants' marketing and promotional strategies if the marks 
were registered. The Judge also identified more important 
areas of conflict, in that insurers regularly promoted their 
products and services through the use of people standing in 
the shoes of the consumer, in which case they would want to 
use the first person possessive adjective. The Judge noted that 
the insurance industry was particularly prone to these diffi-
culties because it routinely used plain English descriptions of 
its products - "car insurance" for example. The Judge said 
that it was not an answer to argue that MY could be used 
both descriptively and distinctively. 
The Judge's second reason for finding the marks were not 
distinctive was that the authorities suggested that using a 
possessive adjective to qualify a purely descriptive noun 
would not be sufficiently distinctive. 11 Here, the Judge referred 
to a number of cases and noted that in the New Zealand 
context careful account must be taken of the way language is 
actually used in marketing.12 The Judge said that, as a matter 
of first principle, doing nothing more than transposing the 
consumer's purely descriptive voice into the mouth of the 
insurer could not be catchy, striking, unusual or a skilful 
allusion. He did not agree that this technique was unusual or 
awkward, and said that traders had always set out to com-
municate with consumers in the consumers' own voice. They 
all wished to capture the consumers' voice in order to have 
them declare that the trader's product is "my choice". He 
said it was not the possessive adjective that carried the true 
meaning of the mark in the MY marks, it was the noun that 
followed, and if that noun was directly descriptive, MY 
would not change that fact. The Judge noted that most of the 
existing MY marks referred to in argument did not use 
generic product names - MY SKY was an example. The 
Judge also referred to the UK Manual of Trade Mark Prac-
tice13 which said that "MY" plus the name of personalised 
goods or services was likely to be unacceptable. The Judge 
also held that the addition of laudatory or other descriptive 
terms in certain of the marks did not save them. He said that 
ADVANCED, STANDARD, PREMIER and similar each 
aptly described the kind or quality of the insurance product 
and were terms that other insurers would legitimately want 
to use in combination with their otherwise generic product 
names. The marks therefore failed the tests in s 18(1)(a) and 
(b). 
The Judge then considered the MY freeB, and MY MULTI 
QUOTE series for which a declaration of invalidity was 
sought. He said that on the reasoning above there was a 
serious argument that the MY freeB and MY MULTI QUOTE 
series were distinctive. However, the Judge had only limited 
material on those issues and was not in a position to properly 
resolve them. He said that the appeal would also be allowed 
in respect of those marks but those matters would need to be 
reheard by the Assistant Commissioner in light of the reasons 
here. The Judge also briefly considered s 18(1)(c) and (d), 
saying that they were subsets of the overall requirement of 
distinctiveness. Since he had already concluded that all but 
two of the AMI marks were purely descriptive and entirely 
generic, in at least one sense, it was sufficient to formally 
conclude that as a result of his analysis in relation to s 18 (1)( a) 
and (b), all AMI marks except MY freeB and MY MULTI 
QUOTE also failed the s 18(l)(c) and (d) tests. 
The appeal was allowed, except that the applications for 
declarations of invalidity in respect ofthe MY MULTI QUOTE 
series and the opposition to registration of the MY freeB 
series, should be reheard by the Assistant Commissioner in 
light of these reasons. Registration of the remaining marks 
was refused, but AMI could pursue, if it wished, registration 
of the marks in relation to non-insurance services before the 
Assistant Commissioner. 
7. Trade Marks Act 2002, s 170, and Austin, Nichols & Co Inc v Stichting Lodestar [2007] NZSC 103, [2008] 2 NZLR 
141 at [5] and [16]. 
8. Registrar of Trade Marks v W& G du Cros Ltd [1913] AC 624 (HL) at 634-635. 
9. "Cycling IS ... " Trade Mark Applications [2002] RPC 37. 
10. Citing Intellectual Property Office of New Zealand, IPONZ Trade Marks Act 2002 Practice Guidelines (online ed) "05 
Absolute grounds distinctiveness" at [3.2.3]. 
11. Including Mainland Products Ltd v Bonlac Foods (NZ) Ltd [1998] 3 NZLR 341 (CA), McCain Foods (Aust) Pty Ltd 
v Conagra Inc [2002] 3 NZLR 40 (CA), and British Sugar PIc v James Robertson & Sons Ltd [1996] RPC 281 (Ch). 
12. Citing McCain Foods (Aust) Pty Ltd v Conagra Inc [2002] 3 NZLR 40 (CA) at [49]. 
13. Citing Intellectual Property Office Manual of Trade Marks Practice (online ed) "The Examination Guide: Addendum" 
at "MY and MY FIRST marks". 
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N V Sumatra Tobacco Trading Co 
v New Zealand Milk Brands Ltd 
[2011] NZSC 113 
This was an unsuccessful application for leave to appeal 
to the Supreme Court against a decision of the Court of 
Appeal14 refusing to allow registration of the mark AN GK 0 R, 
essentially because of the risk of confusion with the respon-
dent's ANCHOR marks. 
The Supreme Court said that the case involved the prac-
tical application of familiar principles to the facts, and the 
IP ROUND-UP: RECENT DECISIONS FROM THE COURTS 
applicant had not identified any particular challenge to those 
principles, which would be necessary for the appeal to involve 
a matter of general or public importance or a matter of 
general commercial significance. It did not raise a particular 
point of law or invoke the miscarriage of justice limb of 
s 13(2) of the Supreme Court Act 2003. The Court noted that 
the applicant failed to challenge the finding on s 17(1)(a) of 
the Trade Marks Act 2002, but that this was probably an 
oversight and not of controlling significance. 
The application for leave to appeal was dismissed. 
14. N V Sumatra Tobacco Trading Co v New Zealand Milk Brands Ltd [2011] NZCA 264. 
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